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International interventions to reestablish peace in conflict areas have multiplied since the end of the Cold 
War, with United Nations operations, non-governmental agencies, diplomatic missions, and regional 
organizations becoming ever more numerous and intrusive. Concurrently, in international relations, a 
large body of literature on peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding – which together this essay 
terms “peace interventions” – has developed. Broadly speaking, peacemaking refers to the process of 
bringing parties in conflict to an agreement through peaceful means, peacekeeping denotes the 
deployment of armed personnel to prevent the resumption of large-scale violence after a peace 
agreement, and peacebuilding includes actions to strengthen and solidify peace.2 
In the international relations literature, the dominant approach, which we might call rational choice, 
overwhelmingly emphasizes that vested interests and material constraints determine peace intervention 
strategies.3 This research has contributed significantly to our understanding of what leads to international 
involvement, whether such engagement makes a difference, and which types of interventions succeed 
and which fail.4 The dominant approach, however, is problematic in two ways. First, it fails to inquire into 
the process through which vested interests and material constraints have been constructed. Second, it 
looks at intervention failures as a “problem for which technical solutions could be worked out,” such as 
additional resources or more robust involvement.5 
In contrast, a different international relations approach has recently developed. It focuses on the influence 
of beliefs, cultures, discourse, frames, habitus, identity, ideology, norms, representations, symbols, and 
worldviews – which together this essay terms “collective” or “shared understandings” – on peace 
interventions. The authors who work with these concepts belong to diverse theoretical schools, but 
political scientists often refer to them as “constructivists,” as they reject the dominant rational choice 
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methodology. They indeed all share the same view on causality: while collective understandings neither 
“cause” nor “determine” action, they render some actions possible and others improbable.6 
Compared to rational choice analyses, the number of constructivist studies on peace interventions 
remains limited. However, its relative size and continuing growth indicates that a map of this literature is 
much needed. Additionally, this review intends to correct a shortcoming in the constructivist literature on 
peace interventions: it rarely builds on or references the large body of anthropological research on 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. (Admittedly, most anthropologists also rarely refer to 
international relations research). This neglect is most likely due to the nature of academic training in both 
disciplines, which limits the use of interdisciplinary approaches, but it is nevertheless surprising given that 
anthropologists work on the same overarching question as international relations constructivists: how do 
collective understandings shape peace interventions? Authors from both disciplines also often examine 
the same cases, such as the international interventions in Somalia and Cambodia. In fact, the 
anthropological body of research on collective understandings and peace interventions is larger than that 
of international relations, as it emerged in the mid-1980s, more than ten years before the first 
constructivist studies appeared. 
Due to these similarities, when reading the two bodies of literature one is struck by the extent to which 
they complement one another. While international relations scholars often adopt a top-down approach 
and look primarily at policy-makers in national capitals and international organization headquarters, 
anthropologists frequently develop bottom-up analyses and focus on specific cases of international 
interventions on the ground. As exceptions to these broad trends demonstrate, and as research in 
comparative politics, area studies, and political anthropology illustrates, only analyses that combine top-
down and bottom-up approaches, and those built on both political science and anthropological questions 
and methods, can provide a full and nuanced picture of the influence of collective understandings on 
peace interventions.7 
Beyond the rigidity of disciplinary boundaries, anthropologists’ reliance on the concept of culture may 
account for international relations scholars’ overlook of anthropological research. A number of political 
scientists view the concept of culture as politically and ideologically biased, and as inadequate to account 
for the complexity of the social world.8 However, in line with political science views, today’s 
anthropologists also reject the formerly dominant conception of culture as “homogeneous, static patterns 
that determine behavior [and that are] uniformly distributed among members of a group.”9 Today’s 
anthropologists working on collective understandings and peace interventions, such as Robert Rubinstein 
and Kevin Avruch, now view culture as “a dynamic … activity that orients and constrains … behavior and 
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thus allows for considerable intracultural variation” and internal contradiction10 – an approach to causality 
similar to that of international relations constructivists. 
Overall, anthropologists and constructivists, as well as area study scholars and political anthropologists, 
agree that a multiplicity of collective understandings orient peace interventions. Interveners and local 
populations belong to a range of national, regional, professional, organizational, ethnic, and religious 
communities, all of which have a specific cultural framework. These frameworks shape actors’ theories on 
the causes of peace and conflict and they “provide the context within which the actors' beliefs and actions 
are constructed, expressed, interpreted and understood.”11 Importantly, the understandings that are 
dominant within each framework are not spread across all international interveners to the same extent. 
Instead, various organizations and sub-units have different identities, sub-cultures, constraints and 
interests (as well as different visions of peace and peace interventions). Scholars from various disciplines 
also emphasize that shared understandings influence interventions more profoundly than the broader 
economic, political, and social contexts, or the vested interests and material constraints on which rational 
choice scholars focus. Indeed, the actors’ cultural, normative, professional, and ideological frameworks, 
as well as their perceptions of time and history, shape their interpretation of constraints, interests, and 
contexts. Finally, a number of constructivists and anthropologists emphasize the policy significance of 
their approach. Research on collective understandings can help explain the conditions for the success or 
failure of peace interventions, and thus help boost their effectiveness.12 
This review examines both the anthropological and international relations literature on collective 
understandings and peace interventions to identify their contributions, elucidate the current debates, 
emphasize the literatures’ complementary and conflicting aspects, and shed light on their respective 
shortcomings. I first look at the top-down research, which focuses on two main topics: national negotiation 
styles and diplomatic culture, and the liberal peace paradigm. After highlighting the deficiencies of this 
top-down approach, I move to two central debates in the bottom-up research on peace interventions: the 
divergence between cultures of interveners and those of local populations, and the significance of the 
interveners’ organizational and professional frames. To conclude, I emphasize areas that remain under-
researched. 
 
Top-Down Approaches: Policy-Makers in Headquarters and National Capitals 
National Negotiation Styles and Diplomatic Culture 
Authors who study peace interventions today regularly build on a large body of literature that looks at how 
national and professional cultures influence international negotiations.13 This literature, which developed 
in the second half of the twentieth century, usually focuses on high-level diplomats and state 
representatives. It can be divided into two different approaches. 
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The first emphasizes the differences between national or regional negotiation styles.14 It argues that 
shared national or regional values can affect “a government’s inclination to negotiate an issue, as 
opposed to adjudicate[ing], arbitrat[ing], or ignor[ing] it,” as well as the “proper pace or appropriate timing 
for certain bargaining behaviors, … [what is] considered a reciprocal obligation, … what constitutes a fair 
and just outcome, … [and how] the prospect of future renegotiation [should] be handled.”15 By contrast, 
the second approach underscores similarities among diplomats. It argues that negotiators share an 
international diplomatic culture, which shapes the actions of diplomats from diverse countries or regions 
in a similar manner.16 Most authors view this professional culture as stemming from Western history and 
values, which links this literature to the debate prevalent in today’s top-down research on peace 
interventions, the debate on the liberal peace. 
The Liberal Peace Debate 
Since the late 1990s, most scholars who examine how collective understandings influence peace 
interventions in headquarters and national capitals have focused on the liberal peace paradigm. The 
constructivist literature on this topic is distinct from the older, rational choice debate, which examines 
whether having states founded on liberal democracy ensures domestic and international peace.17 
Constructivists instead focus on the nature and influence of a “liberal peace agenda.” 
In the constructivist literature on this topic, the dominant narrative emphasizes similarities between 
interveners. It shows that diplomats and international civil servants working for institutions as different as 
the African Union, the International Monetary Fund, various non-governmental organizations, the United 
Nations, the United States, and the World Bank share a distinct world-polity culture. This culture, which 
relies on Western, liberal values, is dominant on the international scene and shapes all of the 
international organizations’ strategies in a similar manner. As a result, Western, liberal norms orient 
international interventions toward the implementation of a liberal peace agenda, which includes the 
organization of elections, the creation of a market economy, and the promotion of human rights and the 
rule of law.18 
Constructivists usually critique this agenda as hegemonic and unsuited to the realities of post-conflict 
environments.19 Many scholars also emphasize that policy-makers consider conflict and post-conflict 
management to be a technical process. Using a checklist approach, today’s interveners view each 
situation as requiring the use of a preexisting toolkit, including the deployment of peacekeepers; the 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants; the repatriation of refugees; the 
liberalization of the economy; and the organization of elections.20 Overall, the constructivist literature 
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insists that the Western, checklist approach to peace interventions can build neither a sustainable peace 
nor a functioning democracy. 
There are two main challenges to this prevalent analysis. Post-structuralist theorists sometimes argue 
that a process more subtle than a mere imposition of Western values is at work. To them, current peace 
interventions are a form of biopolitics: they represent a new type of international regulation that denies the 
exercise of open power and evades accountability for it.21 Organizational theorists develop a distinct 
criticism, which highlights the differences among interveners. These theorists emphasize the significance 
of organizational frames, holding that each institution pursues a different conception of peace, 
peacekeeping, or peacebuilding. These organizational frames are not necessarily related to the liberal 
peace paradigm, but instead are primarily shaped by the internal cultures of international bureaucracies.22 
From this point of view, the liberal peace paradigm is only one of the many shared understandings that 
influence peace interventions in headquarters and national capitals. 
A Partial Picture Based on Misleading Assumptions 
Overall, the literature on liberal peace and international negotiations convincingly demonstrates that a 
world-polity culture (Western and liberal), as well as regional, national, organizational, and professional 
frames, contribute to shaping peace interventions from the top, down. However, this approach provides 
only a partial view of international interventions. It often neglects the concrete, daily practices of 
international action, the social and epistemological tensions among international actors, and the impact of 
public opinion and domestic considerations.23 Moreover, it regularly ignores the need for in-depth 
knowledge of specific cases as a pre-requisite for theoretical contributions. Finally, it overlooks how 
international interventions operate on the ground, meaning both in the rural areas and provinces, where 
most peacebuilders are deployed. 
The top-down approach implicitly assumes that the micro level is a mere replica of the macro level and, 
consequently, that developments on the national and international scenes – or actions taken by 
interveners in the upper political spheres – automatically result in similar transformations in the field. In 
fact, the dynamics of war and peace on the ground are usually distinct from those at the level of the 
state.24 Likewise, instructions from capitals and headquarters do not automatically translate into action in 
the field. Since orders must be interpreted, decentralized interveners have substantial leeway in 
conducting action on the ground.25 Finally, as the following section illustrates, the collective 
understandings prevalent in the field are often different from the shared understandings dominant in 
national capitals and headquarters. 
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Bottom-Up Approaches: Implementers on the Ground 
International Interventions and Local Cultures 
In the bottom-up research on collective understandings and peace interventions, the largest body of work 
focuses on the cultures of the local populations, and specifically how these cultures usually differ from 
those of the international interveners. Numerous social anthropologists and psychologists have 
researched the specific visions of peace and peacemaking in various societies.26 More importantly for our 
topic, many scholars highlight a contrast between the interveners’ conceptions of peace, peacemaking, 
and peacebuilding and those of the local populations (such as in Timor and Somalia).27 Most of this 
literature recalls, sometimes implicitly, the debate on liberal peace, as it emphasizes that interveners use 
a conflict-management technique that is inspired by the liberal peace agenda and is inappropriate for 
most countries where intervention occurs. 
The central insight of this literature is that the interveners’ lack of cultural competence leads to peace 
intervention failures, as it orients intervention strategies toward unproductive approaches, severely affects 
the popularity of the interveners, and even generates conflict between international actors and local 
populations or armed groups.28 Interveners should therefore engage with, and improve their 
understanding of, the local cultures of the host populations to enhance chances of peace success.29 This 
finding has given rise to a large body of literature geared towards practitioners, providing advice on how 
to conduct inter-cultural conflict resolution.30 
Organizational and Professional Cultures 
Within the bottom-up research on peace interventions, a much smaller body of literature goes beyond the 
characterization of the interveners’ approach as Western and liberal, and looks more closely at the 
collective understandings shared by specific kinds of interveners. Such analyses come mostly from 
anthropologists (and a few psychologists). They usually concentrate on organizational cultures, and they 
overwhelmingly focus on military peacekeepers from the United Nations. 
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In addition to researching the cultural differences between peacekeepers and local populations and the 
resulting intervention failures, these anthropologists focus on four main themes. The first is the process 
through which national, organizational, and professional cultures orient the choice of specific 
peacekeeping strategies.31 The second is how differences in national cultures create tensions or 
misunderstandings between various contingents of a peacekeeping mission, and thus decrease the 
mission’s effectiveness.32 Here again, we see a divergence between researchers who emphasize the 
significance of national military cultures, and those who argue that national cultures dissolve into a 
common, military peacekeeping culture, which mitigates misunderstandings between different national 
contingents.33 The third main theme is how gender impacts peacekeeping practices, notably by creating a 
dominant masculine and militaristic culture within the missions.34 Finally, the last theme is concerned with 
“how culture works to maintain peacekeeping as a social institution” and to provide peacekeeping and 
peacekeepers with legitimacy.35 
Bottom-up studies of other components of peace interventions – such as diplomats, civilian 
peacekeepers, and non-governmental peace and justice organization staff members – are much rarer. 
They disproportionately focus on humanitarian and development aid workers. This literature has identified 
a professional outlook dominant in the humanitarian and development field, which shapes aid 
interventions along technical and apolitical strategies.36 Most importantly for this essay, this common 
professional viewpoint orients aid strategies away from an active engagement with on-the-ground 
peacebuilding. 
A related body of literature examines the interactions between the two broad categories of interveners 
mentioned above: military peacekeepers on the one hand, and humanitarian and development aid 
workers (from non-governmental organizations or civilian sections of a United Nations mission) on the 
other. Most authors agree that the members of each group share a distinct and unique professional 
culture. The main differences include conflicting understandings of security and coordination, and the fact 
that militaries are hierarchical, closely controlled, and well-resourced, while non-governmental 
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organizations tend to be decentralized, minimally staffed, and operate independently.37 These differences 
create tensions between civilian and military peacebuilders, which impede cooperation and eventually 
decrease the effectiveness of international interventions. The goal of these studies is therefore to promote 
civil-military cooperation, either by suggesting mechanisms for better coordination or by helping each 
group to better understand the other. 
Three Areas for Further Research 
The bottom-up literature convincingly shows that national, organizational, professional, and gender 
frames or cultures shape peacekeeping action in the field. It also provides several important explanations 
for peacekeeping failures, such as the lack of engagement with local cultures and the divergence 
between national battalions or between military and civilian interveners. However, the overwhelming 
focus on military peacekeepers leaves three topics largely under-researched.38 
First, while the bottom-up literature provides a good grasp of how professional, organizational, and 
national shared understandings influence military peacekeepers, we lack similar knowledge regarding 
diplomats deployed in the field, civilian peacekeepers, and non-governmental peace and justice 
organization staff members. This is problematic given that civilians carry out the bulk of the peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding work. 
Second, as most studies of peace implementation focus on specific groups of interveners, such as 
military peacekeepers or humanitarian aid workers, they tend to study this type of intervention in isolation, 
ignoring its interaction with other, concurrent types of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding 
work. This reductionism often causes analysts to attribute all of the improvements or deteriorations in the 
conflict situation to one kind of organization, though these developments usually result from the combined 
work of different local and external actors. This bias ultimately limits understanding: apart from the 
research on interactions between military and humanitarian actors mentioned above, we have little 
knowledge of how the various kinds of peace actors and functions interact on the ground. We also need 
to move beyond the dichotomy between external and local actors in order to better appreciate the 
normative and material impacts of peace interventions.39 
The overwhelming focus on military peacekeepers and the tendency to study specific groups in isolation 
lead to a third under-researched area. While top-down researchers emphasize both differences and 
similarities between diverse groups of interveners, there is very little comparable bottom-up research. 
Bottom-up researchers almost exclusively emphasize the differences between interveners. Their study of 
similarities is limited to the claim that most interveners adopt a Western, liberal approach to peace. A 
more extensive inquiry into the similarities between interveners, in particular those shaped by elements 
that are not necessarily Western or liberal, would provide significant insights into peace interventions. 
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Conclusion: A Research Agenda 
Although rational choice studies dominate the literature on international peace interventions, there is now 
a significant body of research demonstrating that multiple collective understandings shape peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, and peacebuilding action. These shared understandings include a world-polity culture 
(mostly Western and liberal); regional, national, and local cultures; the internal frames of international 
organizations (such as the World Bank or peacekeeping missions); and the professional outlooks of 
specific groups (such as international negotiators or humanitarian aid workers). The main points of 
contention revolve around two central questions: first, which set of collective understandings is dominant 
and most profoundly influences interventions, and second, whether similarities or differences among 
interveners best explain international intervention practices. 
This literature has greatly contributed to our understanding of international peace interventions and the 
conditions that promote their success or failure. However, the top-down research overlooks how 
international interventions operate on the ground, a problematic approach given that the micro level is not 
a mere replica of the macro level. The bottom-up literature on peace interveners corrects this 
shortcoming, but its overwhelming focus on military peacekeepers leaves three crucial areas under- 
researched: how collective understandings influence non-military peacekeepers, how the various actors 
and functions of peace interventions interact, and whether significant similarities exist between all 
interveners deployed on the ground. 
Both the top-down and the bottom-up literatures also suffer from a common weakness. As most authors 
research how various collective understandings orient interventions toward failure, we have little 
knowledge of how shared understandings can promote peace intervention success. It would be 
worthwhile to expand our enquiry to cases of success: international interventions face such immense 
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